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Patents are a powerful tool because they allow their owners to exclude others 
from the use of the patented technology and charge prices well above competitive 
levels. In the pharmaceutical industry, patents have long created contention 
between drug manufacturers, who regard them as essential to protect their 
investments in the development of new drugs, and consumer advocates, who regard 
the inflated prices as an obstacle to widespread drug access. In recent years, 
settlements to pharmaceutical patent infringement litigation, and specifically the 
so-called “reverse payment” settlements, have provided a new battleground for this 
debate.  
The Supreme Court recently confronted the issue of reverse payment 
settlements in F.T.C. v. Actavis. The Court’s decision has once again raised the 
question of whether patents are the most appropriate form of intellectual property 
protection for the pharmaceutical industry. Technological innovation is a key aspect 
of the pharmaceutical sector from both an economic and a medical perspective. 
Promoting innovation in the pharmaceutical industry benefits both drug 
manufacturers and consumers, but finding the correct balance between the 
interests of those two groups has proven to be a challenge. This paper seeks to 
explore these challenges. The paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides the 
necessary regulatory and judicial background surrounding pharmaceutical patents 
and reverse payment settlements to understand pharmaceutical patent litigation. 
Section III describes the process of pharmaceutical innovation, the effects of generic 
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competition, and the role of pharmaceutical patents. Finally, section IV highlights 
some of the effects of the current regulatory scheme on the rate of pharmaceutical 
innovation and presents some alternative incentive structures that could substitute 
or augment the intellectual property protection given by pharmaceutical patents.  
II.  AN OVERVIEW OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
A. Statutory regulation of the pharmaceutical market 
The pharmaceutical market is one of the most regulated industries in the 
United States.1 No one can legally sell a new drug without first gaining the 
approval of the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”).2 In order to gain FDA 
approval for a pioneer drug – that is one that has never before received FDA 
approval – an applicant must file a New Drug Application (“NDA”).3 The NDA must 
contain detailed information about the new drug – including its chemical 
composition, its method of production, and the reports of the clinical trials showing 
its safety and efficacy – as well as information on any patent related to it.4 If the 
FDA approves the NDA, it publishes the drug and patent information in the 
Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence and Evaluations or what is 
commonly referred to as the “Orange Book.”5 
 
                                                          
1.  Emily M. Morris, The Myth of Generic Pharmaceutical Competition 
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 245, 
251 (2012). 
2.  21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006). 
3.  Id. at § 355(b)(1). 
4.  Id. 
5.  Id. at § 355(j)(7)(A)(i)-(iii). 
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B. The Hatch-Waxman Act 
In an effort to promote competition, Congress enacted in 1984 the Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, commonly known as the Hatch-
Waxman Act.6 The Act streamlined the approval process for generic versions of 
pioneer drugs already approved and included in the Orange Book.7 Specifically, 
generic firms can elect to file an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) 
which simply requires that the applicant prove the generic drug’s “bioequivalence”8 
with the branded product.9 Generic firms, therefore, no longer have to reproduce the 
lengthy and costly clinical trials needed to prove the safety and efficacy of their 
products.10 Rather, they can capitalize on the information submitted by the brand-
name manufacturer in the original NDA application.11 Consequently, the Hatch-
Waxman Act aids competition in that it reduces the time and cost of bringing new 
generic drugs to the market.12 
The Hatch-Waxman Act awards a five-year period of data exclusivity during 
                                                          
6.  21 U.S.C. § 355. 
7.  Id. at § 355(j). 
8.  Bioequivalence refers to “the rate and extent to which the active 
ingredient or therapeutic ingredient is absorbed from a drug and becomes available 
at the site of drug action.” Id. at § 355 (j)(8)(A)(i). 
9.  Henry G. Grabowski & Margaret Kyle, Generic Competition and 
Market Exclusivity Periods in Pharmaceuticals, 28 MANAGERIAL AND DECISION 
ECON. 491, 491-492 (2007). 
10.  Lee Branstetter et al., Starving (or Fattening) the Golden Goose?: 
Generic Entry and the Incentives for Early-Stage Pharmaceutical Innovation, 
(August 1, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/jeffrey_kuhn/Innovation 
_Seminar/Papers/Branstetter_Chatterjee_Higgins_2.pdf. 
11.  Grabowski, supra note 9, at 492. 
12.  Bret Dickey et al., An Economic Assessment of Patent Settlements in 
the Pharmaceutical Industry, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 367, 371 (2010). 
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which generic drugs may not be marketed.13 However, the Act – through what are 
known as Paragraph IV certifications – allows generic manufacturers to file an 
ANDA after only four years from the brand-name drug’s approval and well before 
the expiration of the patents on the brand-name product.14 Notably, the first generic 
manufacturer to file a Paragraph IV certification receives a 180-day market 
exclusivity period.15 This timeframe provides a powerful incentive for generic 
manufacturers to challenge, or invent around, brand-name patents because the 
profits available during the 180-day exclusivity period can be substantial.16  
C. Patent litigation in the context of the Hatch-Waxman Act  
An ANDA filer that makes a Paragraph IV certification commits a 
constructive act of patent infringement.17 The Hatch-Waxman Act requires the filer 
to notify the patent holder of the filing of the Paragraph IV certification and 
provides the brand-name manufacturer 45 days to bring an action for patent 
infringement.18 If an action is brought within this time period, the patent holder is 
                                                          
13. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (c)(3)(E)(ii). Data exclusivity refers to the period of 
time a generic manufacturer has to wait before being allowed access to the clinical 
trial data submitted as part of the pioneer drug’s NDA. 
14.  Id.; id. at § 355 (j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV). 
15.  Id. at § 355 (j)(5)(B)(iii)(IV)(iv)(I). This exclusivity period is triggered 
by the marketing of the first filer’s generic product. Dickey, supra note 12, at 373. 
16.  Dickey, supra note 12, at 373. During those 180 days the brand-name 
and the first generic filer will partake in a duopoly, allowing the first generic filer 
(1) to set prices only slightly below monopolistic values; and (2) to capture a much 
larger share of the market than it would if facing competition from multiple 
generics. 
17.  Bruce R. Genderson, Settlements in Hatch-Waxman Act Patent 
Litigation: Resolving Conflicting Intellectual Property and Antitrust Concerns, 3 
SEDONA CONF. J. 43, 45 (2002). 
18.  21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(B)(iii). 
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granted an automatic stay of the ANDA approval, which prevents the generic drug 
from entering the market.19 The stay will last until the litigation is resolved in favor 
of the ANDA filer or the end of a 30-month period from the Paragraph IV 
notification, whichever comes first.20 Because of the automatic stay, the patent 
litigation will take place before the generic drug is allowed to enter the market.21 
This situation differs drastically from the more typical patent dispute. Commonly, a 
patent holder brings an action against an alleged infringer that is actively utilizing 
the patented technology without the consent of the patent holder.22 Under the 
Hatch-Waxman Act, however, a generic manufacturer can challenge the validity of 
a brand-name patent without the risk of being liable for the damages caused by 
actual infringement.23  
D. “Reverse payment” settlements agreements 
A great number of patent litigations result in settlements.24 The litigation 
risks involved are extremely high for both the alleged infringer, who risks treble 
damages that can reach hundreds of millions of dollars, and the patent holder, who 
risks an equally costly finding of patent invalidity.25 Also, because of the complexity 
of the technologies and of the legal issues involved, the outcome of patent litigation 
is remarkably uncertain – not only at trial but also on appeal, where reversal rates 
                                                          
19.  Id. at § 355 (j)(5)(B)(iii)(I)(aa). 
20.  Id. 
21.  Marc G. Schildkraut, Patent-Splitting Settlements and the Reverse 
Payment Fallacy, 71 ANTITRUST L. J. 1033 (2004). 
22.  Id. at 1036 
23.  Genderson, supra note 17, at 45. 
24.  Id. 
25.  Id. 
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are quite high.26  
In a Hatch-Waxman context, parties have an even greater incentive to 
settle.27 The peculiar nature of a Paragraph IV-induced litigation gives rise to a 
situation of exceptionally asymmetric risks between the litigants. On the one hand, 
the generic manufacturer has a strong economic incentive to adopt risk-seeking 
behavior.28 It faces the possibility of enormous gains in the event of a successful 
challenge for a relatively small price – because there have yet to be any sales of the 
generic drug, damages will be minimal, leaving litigation costs as the only 
expense.29 On the other hand, the brand name is often risk-averse because it has 
much to lose and nothing to gain.30 If it prevails, it will be left in essentially the 
same economic position it had before the litigation, while if it loses its patent-
granted monopoly profits will be lost.31  
Furthermore, parties in a Hatch-Waxman Act patent litigation have, for the 
most part, an incentive to settle on monetary terms.32 Such incentive originates 
from the fact that, holding constant the value received by the generic manufacturer, 
a settlement based on a license will cost the patent holder much more than a 
                                                          
26.  Id. at 46. Depending on the type of claim, patent litigation reversal 
rates range between 10 and 38% against an average for all areas of federal civil 
litigation of 18%. Ted Sichelman, Myths of (Un)Certainty at the Federal Circuit, 43 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1161, 1172-1173 (2010). 
27.  Genderson, supra note 10, at 46. 
28.  Xiang Yu & Anjan Chatterji, Why Brand Pharmaceutical Companies 
Choose to Pay Generics in Settling Patent Disputes: A Systematic Evaluation of the 
Asymmetric Risks in Litigation, 10 NW. J. TECH. AND INTELL. PROP. 19, 21 (2011).  
29.  Id. 
30.  Id. 
31.  Id. 
32.  Genderson, supra note 10, at 47. 
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monetary settlement.33 In contrast to the typical patent litigation settlement, 
however, in the Hatch-Waxman context the payment often flows from the patent 
holder to the alleged infringer – hence the name “reverse payment.”34 These 
settlements have raised much debate and many economists have written on the 
issue. Numerous economists agree that, when real-world complexities are taken 
into account, reverse payments provide the parties in the litigation the negotiation 
flexibility necessary to reach pro-consumer settlements.35 The Federal Trade 
Commission (“F.T.C.”) and several consumer advocacy groups, on the other hand, 
have challenged the legality of reverse payment agreements.36 The F.T.C. regards a 
reverse payment as the parties’ effort to conspire to monopolize the market for a 
                                                          
33.  Id. at 46. A license to the generic would immediately lower the price at 
which the brand name is able to sell its product. This loss of monopolistic profits 
would unlikely be matched by any royalties agreed to as part of the settlement.  
34.  Id. 
35.  Dickey, supra note 12, at 392-393. See also Yu & Chatterji, supra note 
28, at 31 (noting that reverse payments are, in large part, a byproduct of the 
asymmetric litigation risks between the parties); Henry N. Butler & Jeffrey 
Jarosch, Policy Reversal on Reverse Payments: Why Courts Should Not Follow the 
New DOJ Position on Reverse-Payment Settlements of Pharmaceutical Patent 
Litigation, 96 IOWA L. R. 101, 156 (2010)(concluding that reverse payment can have 
anticompetitive as well as procompetitive outcomes depending on the surrounding 
circumstances). But see Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 
RAND J. ECON. 391, 395 (2003)(claiming that reverse payments can never produce 
pro-consumer outcomes). There is, however, a profound difference in the 
methodology employed by Shapiro and those following his model. This group of 
scholars reaches their conclusions by using the concept of “probabilistic patents.” 
Because, they say, there is always a chance that a jury would invalidate a patent, a 
patent does not confer a right to exclude but rather a right to try to exclude by 
asserting the patent in court. While intriguing from a mathematical perspective, 
the concept of “probabilistic rights” has serious flaws when confronted with the rule 
of law. A very good discussion on the topic can be found in Kevin D. McDonald, 
Hatch-Waxman Patent Settlements and Antitrust: On “Probabilistic” Patent Rights 
and False Positives, 17 ANTITRUST 68, 71-72 (2003). 
36. Yu & Chatterji, supra note 28, at 22. 
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particular drug and considers them a violation of the Sherman Act.37 
E. Challenges to the legality of reverse payment settlements 
Reverse settlement agreements have been challenged under antitrust 
principles in various federal courts. The challenges resulted in conflicting opinions 
from different circuit courts. The Second Circuit adopted a policy in favor of 
settlement; the Federal Circuit concluded that the agreements are presumed lawful 
unless they extend beyond the patent exclusivity zone; the Eleventh Circuit 
developed a framework intended to ascertain the appropriate exclusionary zone of 
the patent; while the Third Circuit adopted a “quick look” rule of reason analysis.38 
1.  Second Circuit: In re Tamoxifen  
The Second Circuit considered the issue of reverse payment settlements in In 
                                                          
37. The Sherman Act imputes criminal and civil liability to any person 
who “shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any 
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations . . . ” 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).   
38. Antitrust analysis distinguishes between certain types of practices 
considered inherently anticompetitive, such as price fixing, and “per se” illegal and 
other practices analyzed under a more flexible balancing test known as the “rule of 
reason.” WILLIAM C. HOLMES, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK, §2:9 (2008). The rule of 
reason is a totality of the circumstances analysis aimed at ascertaining whether the 
challenged practice imposes unreasonable restraints on competition. Id. at §2:10. 
Relevant factors can include the defendants’ intent, the structure of the relevant 
market, or the market power of the defendants. Id. An abbreviated version of the 
rule of reason, the “quick look” approach, is used in circumstances when the 
anticompetitive effects of the practice are so intuitively obvious as to be clear 
without a detailed market analysis. Id. Primarily, the quick look approach relieves 
the government from rigorously identifying the relevant market, the defendants’ 




re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation.39 The litigation involved a patent held by 
Zeneca covering Tamoxifen, a widely-prescribed drug for the treatment of breast 
cancer.40 The district court ruled in favor of the Paragraph IV filer, Barr, based on 
fraud against the Patent and Trademark Office.41 While the appeal was pending, 
the parties agreed to a settlement in which Barr would receive $21 million and a 
non-exclusive license to sell Zeneca-manufactured Tamoxifen under Barr’s label, 
and Barr’s supplier, Heumann, would receive payments of over $45 million over ten 
years.42 In return, Barr agreed to change its Paragraph IV certification to a 
Paragraph III certification – thereby agreeing not to enter the market until Zeneca’s 
patent expired unless the patent was subsequently declared invalid due to litigation 
with anther challenger.43 
The agreement was challenged by various consumers, providers of medical 
benefits, and consumer advocacy groups.44 The district court rejected the charges 
and granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss.45 In affirming the district court’s 
                                                          
39.  466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006).  
40. Id. at 193. 
41.  Id. A finding of fraud against the PTO bars enforcement of a patent 
thereby effectively invalidating the patent. See e.g. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, 
Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
42.  Id. at 193-194. 
43. Id. Over the years following the agreement, three other generic 
manufactures challenged the patent by filing a Paragraph IV certification, but each 
time the courts upheld the validity of Zeneca’s patent. See Zeneca Ltd. v. 
Novopharm Ltd., 111 F.3d 144, 1997 WL 168318, at *2–*4 (Fed. Cir. Apr.10, 
1997)(unpublished opinion); Zeneca Ltd. v. Pharmachemie B.V., 2000 WL 34335805, 
at *15 (D.Mass. Sept.11, 2000); AstraZeneca UK Ltd. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., No. 
00–2239, slip op. at 2–3 (W.D.Pa. Nov. 30, 2000). 
44. Id. at 196.  
45.  Id. at 197. 
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decision, the Second Circuit stressed how courts must encourage the settlement of 
litigation and noted that restricting patent settlements might be contrary to the 
goals of patent laws since increased uncertainty surrounding patents might harm 
innovation.46 The court also rejected the argument that the settlements would allow 
an invalid patent to remain in force and that reverse payments are inherently 
anticompetitive.47 The court reasoned that, due to the inherent risk of litigation, 
settlements of legitimate disputes intended to eliminate that risk should be allowed 
and that a patent holder paying to protect its patent-granted monopoly, without 
more, is not a violation of the Sherman Act.48  
2.  Federal Circuit: In re Ciprofloxacin  
The Federal Circuit considered the issue of reverse payment settlements in 
In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrocloride Antitrust Litigation.49 Just before trial, the parties 
agreed to a settlement in which the generic manufacturer, Barr, agreed to cease 
challenging the patent and delay market entry until six months prior to patent 
expiration.50 In exchange, the patent owner, Bayer, agreed to pay Barr $49.1 million 
and either supply it with the drug for resale or make quarterly payments for a 
period of seven years.51 Advocacy groups challenged the agreement on antitrust 
                                                          
46.  Id. at 202-203.  
47. Id. at 204.  
48.  Id. at 205. 
49.  544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
50.  Id. at 1328-1329.  
51.  Id. at 1329. In subsequent years, the validity of the patent was upheld 




The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the 
Federal Circuit affirmed.53 In doing so, the Federal Circuit distinguished the 
Ciprofloxacin agreement from others where the restraints on the generic 
manufacturer extended the patent exclusivity zone.54 The court concluded that, 
when the anticompetitive effects of the settlement are “within the exclusionary 
power of the patent,” the application of the rule of reason under antitrust law must 
produce the same outcome as an analysis of the right to exclude granted by the 
patent under patent law.55  
3.  Eleventh Circuit: Watson Pharmaceuticals  
The most recent appellate decision on reverse payments in the Eleventh 
Circuit is the ruling in F.T.C. v. Watson Pharmaceuticals.56 The original litigation 
involved a Paragraph IV challenge to Solvay’s patent on AndroGel, a topical gel 
used to treat low testosterone in men, by two generic manufacturers.57 The 
litigation ended when the parties agreed to a settlement providing that the generic 
manufacturers would (1) refrain from marketing their generic version of the drug 
for a period of nine years; (2) promote the branded AndroGel to urologists; and (3) 
                                                          
52.  Id.   
53. Id. at 1330, 1340. 
54.  Id. at 1335. The court cited In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig. where 
(1) the generic manufacturer had not relinquished the 180-day exclusivity period, 
thereby preventing other generic manufacturer form entering the market; and (2) 
the generic agreed not to market non-infringing versions of the generic drug. 332 
F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003). 
55.  Id. at 1336. 
56. 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012).  
57.  Id. at 1303-1304.  
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serve as backup manufacturers.58 In exchange, Solvay agreed to pay $10 million a 
year for six years – plus an additional $2 million a year for the backup 
manufacturing – to one of the generic manufacturers and share some of its 
AndroGel profits with the other.59 The F.T.C. filed an antitrust suit claiming the 
settlement was an agreement not to compete and the district court granted the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss.60 
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the rule it developed in three previous 
decisions61 that, absent sham litigation of fraud, reverse payment settlements that 
remain within the exclusionary zone of the patent are immune from antitrust 
attacks.62 Furthermore, the court firmly rejected the F.T.C. argument that an 
antitrust claim could be based on allegations that the patent holder was “not likely 
to prevail” in the patent infringement action.63 Describing the F.T.C. argument as 
equating a likely result – the invalidation of the patent – with an actual result, the 
court remarked that “[p]redicting the future is precarious at best; retroactively 
predicting from a past perspective a future that never occurred is even more 
perilous.”64 
 
                                                          
58.  Id. at 1305.   
59.  Id.   
60. Id. at 1306.  
61. The three decisions were: Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 
F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003); Schering–Plough Corp. v. F.T.C., 402 F.3d 1056 (11th 
Cir. 2005); and Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Elan Corp., 421 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2005). 
62. Watson Pharm., 677 F.3d  at 1312.  
63. Id.   
64.  Id. at 1313.  
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4.  Third Circuit: In re K–Dur  
The Third Circuit addressed reverse payments in In re K–Dur Antitrust 
Litigation.65 The brand manufacturer, Schering, held a patent on the controlled-
release coating used in K–Dur, its potassium chloride supplement.66 Two generic 
manufacturers, Upsher and ESI Lederle, filed ANDAs providing Paragraph IV 
certification compelling Schering to file suit to defend its patent.67 Both litigations 
terminated with reverse payment agreements. The Schering-Upsher agreement 
provided that Upsher would refrain from marketing its generic version of K–Dur, or 
any similar product, for four years in exchange for a payment of $60 million.68 The 
Schering-ESI agreement provided that ESI would not develop a potassium chloride 
product and would receive in return $15 million and a non-exclusive license to K–
Dur starting eight years following the agreement.69 
The F.T.C. filed a complaint against Schering, Upsher and ESI alleging that 
the settlements unreasonably restrained commerce and that the reverse payments 
intended to preserve Schering’s monopoly by delaying generic entry.70 In ruling in 
favor of the F.T.C., the Third Circuit rejected the “scope of the patent” test as 
granting an almost unrebuttable presumption of patent validity.71 Instead, the 
court adopted a “quick look” rule of reason analysis in which a reverse payment 
                                                          
65. 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012).  
66.  Id. at 203.  
67.  Id. at 205.  
68.  Id. at 205-206.  
69.  Id. at 206.  
70.  Id. at 206-207.  
71. Id. at 214.  
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constitutes prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint of trade, rebuttable 
only “by showing that the payment (1) was for a purpose other than delayed entry 
or (2) offers some pro-competitive benefit.”72 
F. The Supreme Court’s response in Actavis 
In response to a deepening split among the circuits, the Supreme Court 
granted a writ of certiorari in F.T.C. v. Watson Pharmaceuticals.73 The Court 
reversed the near-automatic antitrust immunity provided by the Eleventh Circuit.74 
Rather, the Court concluded that reverse payment settlements should be reviewed 
under a full rule of reason analysis.75  
The Court based the ruling that reverse settlements should be subject to 
antitrust scrutiny on five sets of considerations.76 First, the Court noted that these 
types of agreements have “the potential for genuine adverse effects on 
competition.”77 Second, while sometimes the agreements are justified – such as 
when the payment is an approximation of litigation expenses saved through the 
settlement, or reflects compensation for other services offered by the generic 
manufacturer – when no such redeeming qualities are present the anticompetitive 
effects might prove unduly harmful.78 Third, firms willing to make large payments 
may possess market power – the ability to charge prices higher than the competitive 
                                                          
72. Id. at 218.   
73.  F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2230 (2013).  
74. Id. at 2237.  
75. Id.  
76. Id. at 2234.  
77.  Id.  
78.  Id. at 2236.  
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level.79 Fourth, normally there would be no need to litigate the patent’s validity in 
order to answer the antitrust question because an “unexplained large reverse 
payment” in itself can provide a proxy for an invalid patent.80 Fifth, the parties 
have other means to settle the litigation that do not involve large and unjustified 
reverse payments and are, therefore, not at risk of antitrust liability.81  
Further, the Court refused the F.T.C.’s argument that reverse payment 
settlements should be presumed unlawful. Rather than a “quick look” approach, the 
Court held that reverse payments must be reviewed under a full rule of reason 
analysis.82 A “quick look” approach, the Court reasoned, is appropriate only when 
“an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude 
that the agreements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on consumers 
and market.”83 Therefore, because of the inherent complexities of reverse payment 
settlements in the Hatch-Waxman Act context, the Court concluded that the 
settlement challenger should prove its case under a full rule of reason analysis.84 
The Supreme Court created an approach that will be difficult to apply in 
practice because is unclear how a full rule of reason analysis can be performed 
without attempting to assess patent validity.85 It is also unclear what means for 
reverse payments to be “large” and “unjustified,” the telltale signs of 
                                                          
79. Id.  
80.  Id.  
81. Id. at 2237  
82. Id.  
83. Id.  
84. Id.  
85.  The Court remarked that it is “normally not necessary to litigate 
patent validity to answer the antitrust question[.]” Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236. 
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anticompetitive agreements according to the Court.86 The resulting high level of 
uncertainty leaves the parties two equally undesirable choices: litigate the patent 
dispute until a final judgment or risk highly uncertain and complex post-settlement 
antitrust litigation. This situation can severely affect the economic choices of 
innovator drug manufacturers and have serious repercussions on the 
pharmaceutical industry. Of particular concern are the negative effects on the rate 
of pharmaceutical innovation that result from insufficient patent protection.  
III.  INNOVATION IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
One of the goals of the Hatch-Waxman Act was to balance an increase in 
generic competition with adequate incentives that would encourage the continued 
innovation of new drugs.87 However, the Supreme Court’s decision is oddly devoid of 
any consideration regarding the effects of increased uncertainty on future 
innovation in the pharmaceutical industry. 
A. Pharmaceutical research and development 
Technological innovation is the essence of the pharmaceutical industry — one 
of the most research-intensive sectors in the United States.88 The industry’s focus 
on innovation is aptly illustrated by the estimated $48.5 billion spent on research 
and development (“R&D”) by Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of 
                                                          
86. Id. at 2237. 
87. Henry G. Grabowski et al., Evolving Brand-Name and Generic Drug 
Competition May Warrant a Revision of the Hatch-Waxman Act, 30 HEALTH AFFAIRS 
2157, 2157 (2011). 
88. Dickey, supra  note 12, at 369 (citing CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH 
AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 7-9 (2006)). 
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America (“PhRMA”) members in 2012.89 Innovation in the pharmaceutical industry 
is a risky, costly, and time-consuming endeavor. Innovator firms place the largest 
portion of their R&D effort into developing new chemical entities (NCE).90  
Typically, developing a NCE is a process that requires several years. First, 
considerable research is needed in order to synthesize a new compound.91 Once a 
new promising compound is discovered, it will be subject to screening for 
pharmacological activity and toxicity, first in vitro and then in animals.92 If the 
compound is still considered a promising candidate after the initial screening then 
clinical trials will begin. Human testing normally occurs over three phases with 
increasing numbers of test subjects. Phase I, designed to obtain toxicity information 
and safe dosage ranges, is conducted on a small number of healthy volunteers.93 
Phase II is aimed at proving the drug’s efficacy and is performed on a larger 
number of individuals, usually in the hundreds, selected among those patients for 
whom the drug is intended to be beneficial.94 Lastly, Phase III involves large-scale 
testing on thousands of patients and is used to provide additional support to the 
previous efficacy findings, as well as to detect possible side-effects.95  
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B. Costs and success rates of pharmaceutical R&D 
Typically, it takes about twelve years for a new medicine to complete the 
R&D cycle from initial discovery to market launch.96 Further, only a small fraction 
of the promising compounds tested in the pretrial phase are eventually brought to 
market.97 Indeed, for every 5,000 compounds tested, on average only five will be 
tested in clinical trials, and only one of those will receive final FDA approval.98  
Given the complexity and length of the R&D effort, it is not surprising that 
the costs of such endeavors are extremely high. Several studies, over different time 
periods, have provided estimates of the R&D expenditures required to develop and 
bring to market a new drug. Although several of these studies were based on 
different data sources, taken together these studies point to a steeply rising cost of 
R&D.99 After normalizing the various studies’ results to 2011 prices for comparison 
purposes, the estimated cost of bringing a new drug to market was $199 million in 
the late 1970s, $451 million in the early 1900s, $1,031 million in the early 2000s, 
and $1,867 million in 2010.100 Such drastic increase is due, in large part, to the 
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growth in the size and length of clinical trials and an increased failure rate.101 In 
particular, research has focused increasingly on developing drugs for chronic 
illnesses that require prolonged clinical trials.102 
C. Effects of generic competition 
Brand-name drugs lose the majority of their sales to their generic equivalent. 
The generic share of dispensed prescription drugs has steadily increased from the 
time the Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted, growing from 18.6% in 1984 to 74.5% in 
2009.103 Further, the rate of market-share erosion brand-name drugs suffer has 
greatly accelerated over time. In the years immediately following the enactment of 
the Hatch-Waxman Act, it took generic drugs about three to four years to obtain a 
dominant share of the market.104 But by 2008, brand-name drugs on average 
retained a market share of only 37% merely one month after generic entry, a figure 
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that rapidly declined to 19% six months following generic entry.105 “Blockbuster” 
drugs – drugs with average annual sales of more than $100 million – are even more 
affected, as they suffer even faster market-share erosion.106 If on the one hand fast 
market penetration of generic drugs allows for a reduction in healthcare costs, on 
the other it produces undesirable results that, while difficult to quantify, might 
more than offset the welfare gains due to lower prices.107  Specifically, one major 
concern is whether innovator-drug manufacturers have the opportunity to 
recuperate the costs of R&D, earn a positive return on that investment, and 
maintain a steady rate of innovation. 
D. Protecting investments in pharmaceutical innovation 
Patent laws are designed to encourage investments in research and 
innovation. They attempt to do so by providing the patent holder the right to 
exclude others from making, selling, or using the patented invention for a period of 
twenty years from the date the patent was filed.108  Given the time, cost, and high 
risk of failure of the R&D process, pharmaceutical companies rely heavily on 
patents to protect their investment. The proceeds from the sale of a drug that is 
successfully brought to market will not only repay the company’s shareholders for 
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their investment, but also fund new research.109 For this reason, the 
pharmaceutical industry is believed to depend on intellectual property rights more 
than every other industry.110 Despite that, patents are a less effective method of 
protecting an innovator firm’s investment in the pharmaceutical context than in 
other industries. 
First, while nominally a patent provides protection for twenty years, the 
effective life of a patent111 is often less because patents are frequently obtained 
before marketing.112 Estimates indicate that on average a patent will provide 18.5 
years of effective patent life.113 The situation is even worse in the pharmaceutical 
industry. Innovator firms normally apply for patents soon after the non-clinical 
testing process; given the length of clinical trials and the time necessary to receive 
FDA approval, pharmaceutical patents lose much of their nominal life before 
marketing even begins.114 Recognizing this problem, the Hatch-Waxman Act 
provides restoration of the patent time lost in the regulatory review and clinical 
testing.115 The Act, however, caps the length of the restoration period at five 
years.116 Estimates indicate that, even accounting for the patent restoration period, 
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the average effective patent life for new drugs is only 13.5 years.117 Furthermore, 
the average effective patent life on blockbuster drugs is even shorter: approximately 
11 years.118 
Second, Paragraph IV challenges are one of the main factors responsible for 
the discrepancy between nominal and effective patent life.119 Drugs that face 
Paragraph IV challenges have an estimated reduction in effective patent life of two 
years.120 Unsurprisingly, given the great economic incentives enjoyed by a generic 
challenger, Paragraph IV certifications have been increasing in number.121 
Furthermore, Paragraph IV challenges disproportionally target blockbuster 
drugs.122 These drugs frequently have a great therapeutic value, as they are those 
most likely to be first-in-class or best-in-class products, providing care for otherwise 
unmet medical needs.123 In addition, brand name manufacturers are critically 
dependent on the revenues from blockbuster drugs in order to earn positive returns 
on their R&D efforts.124 Given their tremendous importance from both a medical 
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and economic perspective then, blockbuster drugs are those most in need of effective 
intellectual property protection. Despite this, these drugs are 59% more likely to 
face Paragraph IV challenges than other drugs and are often challenged early on 
after their market launch.125  
Therefore, patents in the pharmaceutical industry are a less effective method 
of protecting an innovator firm’s investment than in other industries because they 
guarantee fewer years of market exclusivity. First, a good portion of a 
pharmaceutical patent’s life is lost during the pre-marketing years of clinical trials 
and the FDA approval process. Second, the increasing number of Paragraph IV 
challenges further reduces the estimated market exclusivity period, especially for 
those drugs more likely to earn positive returns and fuel new investments in R&D.   
IV. PROMOTING PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION  
 
Because of the high costs and risks of developing new drugs, pharmaceutical 
manufacturers need reliable intellectual property protections. As we have seen, 
however, patents are not as effective a mean of protecting investments in 
pharmaceutical innovation as they are in other industries. The Actavis decision 
further diminishes the value provided by pharmaceutical patents because it 
increases the uncertainty tied to patent litigation in the Hatch-Waxman context.  
While the Hatch-Waxman Act intended to strike a balance between promoting 
competition and innovation, the interplay of the Act’s provisions may have had the 
effect of tipping the scale too much in favor of the former. To avoid the consequence 
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of severely limiting new drug development, it may be necessary to rethink the 
incentive structure provided by the Hatch-Waxman Act.  
A. Effects of the Hatch-Waxman Act on the rate of innovation 
As we have seen, R&D of pharmaceuticals is a costly, lengthy, and risky 
process. For this reason, for every new drug successfully brought to market, 
manufacturers need a correspondingly lengthy period of time to earn a positive risk-
adjusted return on the R&D investment.126 For most drugs, the data exclusivity 
period of five years provided by the Hatch-Waxman Act is not enough to recuperate 
the R&D costs and earn a positive return.127 In fact, it is estimated that it takes 
about six years for most drugs to start earning positive marginal returns.128 As a 
consequence, only about 20% of brand name drugs earn sufficient revenues to 
recoup average R&D costs.129 Therefore, the Hatch-Waxman Act – featuring a short 
data exclusivity period, a streamlined approval process favoring early generic entry, 
and substantial rewards to generic manufacturers who challenge patents – has 
created an even greater uncertainty as to whether innovators may recover an 
appropriate return on their research investments. 
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Furthermore, pharmaceutical R&D is predominantly funded by internal 
financing sources.130 That is because the combination of the length of the R&D 
process, the great uncertainty about the R&D outcomes, and the information 
asymmetries between drug manufacturers and outside investors make external 
funds difficult to obtain and extremely costly.131 For this reason, two major factors 
affecting pharmaceutical manufacturers’ R&D investment behavior are the 
availability of internal funds and the expected returns on the R&D investment.132 
By affecting both of these factors, the Hatch-Waxman Act has had the unintended 
consequence of severely limiting new drug development.133 First, the Hatch-
Waxman Act greatly facilitates early market entry of generics which, since the Act’s 
enactment, have eroded brand manufacturers’ revenues at an alarmingly increasing 
rate.134 The reduction in brand manufacturers’ cash flows resulting from generics’ 
market penetration decreases the availability of internal funds used to finance new 
research. Empirically, experts have calculated that a 10% increase in generic 
penetration decreases the flow of early-stage innovation by 7.3%.135 Second, by 
increasing the uncertainty concerning pharmaceutical patents, the Hatch-Waxman 
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Act lowers the expected return on R&D investments.136 A reduction in the expected 
value of pharmaceutical patents decreases drug manufacturers’ incentives to 
engage in the highly risky and expensive R&D process. Indeed, experts have 
estimated that a 10% increase in Paragraph IV challenges leads to a 3.9% decrease 
in early-stage innovation.137  
B.  Longer exclusivity periods: the case of biologics 
In recent years, advances in molecular biology have stimulated the 
development of large molecule biologic-based pharmaceutical products.138 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers increasingly have been attracted to biologics, not 
only because of their great potential to provide breakthrough therapies, but also for 
the economic benefits they offer.139 In particular, unlike conventional chemical-
based drugs, brand-name biologics face virtually no competition from generic 
imitations or biosimilars.140 There are two main reasons contributing to the lack of 
generic competition. First, the manufacturing of biologics is more difficult and 
subject to greater regulatory requirements than the manufacturing of chemical-
based drugs.141 Second, while biosimilars can be close substitutes to the branded 
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biologics of reference, they are not chemically identical and therefore not completely 
interchangeable.142  
As part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), Congress 
created an abbreviated pathway for biosimilars, similar to the one for generic drugs 
under the Hatch-Waxman Act.143 As Congress tried to balance proper incentives for 
innovation with consumer interests, it extensively debated the appropriate length of 
the data exclusivity period to be afforded to innovator manufacturers.144 As a 
consequence of that debate, the ACA grants a new innovative biologic twelve years 
of data exclusivity.145 Therefore, the data exclusivity period for biologics is now 
much longer than for new chemical entities.146 Data exclusivity provides a form of 
intellectual property protection that is considerably stronger than patents because 
it is not subject to legal challenges.147 Longer data exclusivity periods for biologics, 
coupled with the increasingly uncertain outcomes of Paragraph IV challenges, raise 
the question of whether the incentives for future innovation are artificially skewed 
in favor of biologics. 
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The current regulatory environment has produced strong economic incentives 
to shift the focus of research to biologics.148 Pharmaceutical manufacturers already 
seem to be responding to these incentives, as biologics account for almost half of all 
drugs currently being tested in clinical trials.149 In the long run this shift could have 
severe negative repercussions on healthcare costs because biologics are significantly 
more expensive to produce than chemical-based drugs.150 Extending the period of 
data exclusivity for chemical-based drugs to match the period afforded to biologics 
might help to counterbalance these effects. Estimates indicate that increasing the 
data exclusivity period to twelve years would produce a 5% increase in the expected 
revenues generated over a drug’s lifetime.151 Empirical evidence strongly supports 
the notion that profits drive innovation.152 Accordingly, experts estimate that a data 
exclusivity period for chemical-based drugs extended to twelve years could result in 
an additional 228 drug approvals between 2020 and 2060.153 Therefore, when given 
longer data exclusivity periods, manufacturers would be more likely to pursue many 
promising new therapies that otherwise might not be developed. 
C. A system of combined incentives: the orphan drugs example  
Stimulating innovation was the primary motivation behind another widely 
debated legislation: the Orphan Drug Act of 1983 (“ODA”).154 The ODA was 
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designed to encourage the development of so called “orphan drugs” – drugs that are 
useful for a rare disease or condition – by providing a series of economic incentives. 
The statute defines a rare condition as one (1) that affects fewer than 200,000 
individuals within the United States; or (2) for which there is no reasonable 
expectation to recover the costs of making and marketing a drug.155 An orphan drug 
is one that manufacturers were typically unwilling to take through the lengthy and 
costly FDA approval process because, given the rareness of the condition that it is 
meant to treat, has a very small likelihood to generate positive returns. To 
overcome such great economic deterrent, the ODA created a system combining four 
types of incentives. First, it makes available a grants program to help defray the 
costs of testing and clinical trials.156 Second, it provides FDA advice and counseling 
on the protocol of tests and experiments the drug sponsor needs to complete to gain 
marketing approval.157 Third, it establishes a tax credit for fifty percent of the 
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amounts spent performing clinical trials.158 Fourth, it guarantees a seven-year 
market exclusivity period.159  
The ODA provisions stimulate investments in the development of orphan 
drugs in two ways. The first three ODA provisions effectively subsidize research 
inputs, thereby lowering the cost of pharmaceutical R&D. The last provision helps 
reduce the risk associated with pharmaceutical R&D because, by barring early 
generic entry, it guarantees manufacturers a longer period of time to earn positive 
returns on their investments. This combination of incentives has unquestionably 
been successful in stimulating the development of drugs for rare diseases. While 
only a handful of such drugs were available before the passage of the act, by 2007 
the FDA had designated 1,793 orphan products; 322 of these having received 
marketing approval.160  
V. CONCLUSION 
Balancing consumer interests with sufficient incentives to foster 
pharmaceutical innovation is not an easy task. On the one hand, there is a critical 
need to curtail healthcare costs and increase drug accessibility. On the other, 
regulatory policies that affect the returns of pharmaceuticals, and in particular of 
blockbuster drugs, can have significantly negative consequences on the rate of 
innovation in the industry. Long-term trends in the industry, as well as more recent 
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developments, make it highly questionable whether patents remain the most 
appropriate form of intellectual property protection for pharmaceutical products. To 
avoid the consequence of severely limiting new drug development, it might be 
necessary to rethink the incentive structure provided by the Hatch-Waxman Act. A 
mixed-incentives system could be devised to replace what is currently in place. The 
new system could not only offer pharmaceutical innovator firms a greater likelihood 
of recovering R&D expenses – through longer statutorily-granted exclusivity periods 
– but also lower the costs of research by offering a tax credit for amounts spent on 
research. These types of incentives have proven to be extremely successful in niche 
areas of the pharmaceutical industry and could help restore the proper balance 
sought when the Hatch-Waxman Act was originally enacted. 
 
